This paper will explore Turkish Cypriot identity in a historical setting and scrutinize 4 the scope of identity contestations within the community in the context of growing 5 affiliation with the European Union. Highlighting the effects of significant issues such 6
Introduction
The Turkish Cypriot identity is in a process of re-constructing itself 24 following the division of the island in 1974. In this process, two rival 25 understandings of identity, namely an ethnic identity based on Turkish 26 nationalism and a civic identity based on Cypriotism 1 , are competing with each 27 other. Until recent decades, Turkish nationalism was the dominant conception 28 of identity among the Turkish Cypriots. Nevertheless, its dominance has 29 become increasingly insecure recently, as manifest in with the rise of 30 alternative identity conceptions. Cypriotist identity became particularly strong 31 after the Europeanization of the Cyprus conflict since 1990s and emerged as 32 the main rival of ethnic nationalism. The election of Mustafa Akıncı, a long-33 standing advocate of Cypriotist identity and federalism, to the community's 34 leadership in 2015 elections with more than 60% of the vote was a strong 35 indicator of a shift of identity in North Cyprus. Recent surveys also indicate the 36 growing popularity of a more Cypriot-centric Turkish Cypriotness. While only 37 9.3% of Turkish Cypriots identify themselves as Cypriot in a 2007 survey 2 this 38 ration dramatically increased and reached to 43% in another survey conducted 39 in 2014 3 . Furthermore, other surveys reveal that 80% of the community 40 1 Cypriotism refers to idea that Cyprus has its own particular character which are different from the motherland's characteristics (Mavratsas, 1998) . 2 See Psaltis, C. (2012) . Culture and social representations: A continuing dialogue in search for heterogeneity in social developmental psychology. Culture & Psychology, 18 , 375-390. 3 Turkish Cypriot identity has been the subject of increasing scholarly attention 23 especially since mid-2000s. Previous studies generally focused on the social 24 and political transformation in the north which enabled alternative identities to 25 challenge Turkish nationalism, (Lacher&Kaymak, 2005) and explained identity 26 fluctuations as a response to variations in socialization (Vural&Rüstemli, 2006) 27 and in the context of Turkish Cypriots' transnational position between Turkey, 28 Greek Cypriots and the EU (Ramm, 2006) . Nonetheless, the impact of a 29 contested identity on the peace process and relations with Turkey has been 30 largely overlooked in the current literature. This paper is a part of this growing 31 academic interest aims at explaining how identity contestations in the north 32 influence the preferences and position of the Turkish side in Cyprus peace 33 negotiations. It also aims to provide an update for literature on Turkish Cypriot 34 identity by focusing on the effects of more recent developments. Apparently, 35 identities are not the only factors shaping the preferences of the Turkish side in 36 peace talks, yet they determine available options which can be legitimized in 37 the eyes of public opinion. The study has been shaped by data collection, 38 which includes election results, polls and surveys, media sources and literature 39 on Turkish Cypriot identity. Before analysing contested nature of Turkish Cypriotness, let us first 1 briefly discuss the importance of identity in the formulation of preferences and 2 threat perceptions. The concept of identity is central to the constructivist 3 approach in International Relations theory. According to constructivists, 4 identities are necessary in both domestic and international politics. As Hopf 5 (1998:175) says 'they perform three necessary functions in a society: they tell 6 you and others who you are and they tell you who others are'. By doing so, 7 identities suggest a particular set of interests for actors. Even though actors 8 may choose particular identities in accordance with their interests, these 9 interests themselves presuppose still deeper identities. The constructivist 10 account of identity also sheds light on the relationship between identity, power 11 and threat perceptions. According to constructivists such as Risse Kappen threat perceptions, they are not stable and are often contested between different 16 social groups in a society (Barnett, 1996: 400-32) . To put it differently, no 17 state's identity is totally secure or stable since identities are always open to 18 contestation. Nonetheless, the identities of some states at certain times may be 19 less secure than others. The scope of identity contestation will depend on many 20 factors such as homogeneity of a society in terms of ethnicity, race or religion, 21 the economic conditions, the political system and international status as well as 22 affiliation to other national or international political entities. In unrecognized 23 states which lacks external sovereignty like North Cyprus, a secure identity 24 plays a vital role in state consolidation and the maintenance of internal 25 sovereignty (Rodger, 2015) . Such entities, which are generally established 26 through use of force in a homogenized territory, can draw upon the memory of 27 civil war while fostering the image of a 'common external enemy' to achieve 28 national unification and consolidate their statehood (Kolsto, 2006) . (Vural and Rüstemli, 2006) . Accordingly, the island's two communities were 7 institutionalized as distinct cemaats (political community) and were able to 8 choose their own judicial and administrative officials. As Yılmaz (2005: 22 stated British colonial policies strengthened identification within each 23 community and sharpened their cleavages. The Turkish Cypriot community 24 continued to identify itself as Ottoman or Muslim before the emergence of 25 nationalism in Turkey. Due to lack of ethnic consciousness, most of Turkish 26 Cypriots preferred the continuation of the British rule on the island and did not 27 develop an alternative to enosis. 28 The First World War (WWI) and the subsequent Turkish War of consciousness among many Turkish Cypriots. Although they were excluded 35 from the nation-building project in Turkey, many adopted the Kemalist 36 ideology of Turkish nationalism which highlighted secularism and equated 37 modernization with Westernization. Turkish Cypriot elites did not only 38 perceive Kemalism as an appropriate instrument for modernizing their 39 community but also as a tool for resisting Greek nationalism on the island. 40 Consequently, most Turkish Cypriots adopted Kemalist values voluntarily and 41 earlier than many Turkish mainlanders (Bryant, 2004: 233) . This voluntary and Cypriots while discouraging trade with Greek Cypriots. Simultaneously, most 7 of the original Greek names of the island's Turkish settlements were Turkified. 8 In brief, the national consciousness of Turkish Cypriots grew in direct 9 proportion to the rise of enosis and acted as the main justification for the 10 preference of taksim. (Markides, 1977: 23) Cypriots claimed that Turkish Cypriots were given a disproportionate influence 22 and regarded the constitution as illegitimate and discriminatory. 23 Unsurprisingly, the republic's bi-communal system collapsed in 1963 after the 24 Turkish Cypriot rejection of some constitutional amendments proposed by the Cypriot leadership unwillingly continued to negotiate for a federal agreement. The events of 1974 deeply influenced the identity perceptions of the 14 island's communities. The physical division did not only halt the interaction 15 between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots but also ended the visibility of the 16 'other'. However, the effects of the division were felt differently in the south 17 and the north of the green line. 9 In the south, military defeat revealed dangers definition and did not form a basis for a common Cypriot national identity. 28 Although Cypriotness was defined only as a geographical feature, Turkish 29 nationalism aimed to fix North Cyprus as a 'home' for Turkish Cypriots. As 30 Özkırımlı and Sofos (2008: 103) stated 'nationalism is almost invariably 31 haunted by a fixation on territory, the quest for a "home", actual or imagined'. 32 Nevertheless, this reconstruction has been an uneasy task for the Turkish Cypriots while justifying and empowering federalist preferences. 7 8 Rise of an Alternative Identity to Turkish Nationalism: Cypriotism in 9 North Cyprus 10 11 During the 1980s, Cypriotism has emerged as an alternative identity to 12 Turkish nationalism among some Turkish Cypriots. Cypriotist discourse was 13 originated from the Marxist ideology and depicted ethnic nationalism as a case 14 of false consciousness serving the interests of the bourgeoisie in both sides. 15 Accordingly, it highlights the differences of Cyprus from both Greece and 16 Turkey while stressing and promoting a common Cypriot culture and identity. 17 This ideology was particularly popular among younger Turkish Cypriots who 18 embraced leftist ideology while studying at Turkish universities during late 19 1970s 10 and believed that the 'internationalist' tradition of the left could 20 facilitate the peaceful co-existence of Turkish and Greek Cypriots in a re- 21 united Cyprus (Vural and Rüstemli, 2006: 339) . Cypriotists supported a civic 22 identity which would allow diversity while preserving a sense of geographical 23 location and is associated with the preference of a united and federal Cyprus. 24 Accordingly, the consciousness of 'mother Cyprus' as opposed to Turkey as 25 'motherland' was proposed by the Cypriotist circles in the north. 26 Nevertheless, this camp which included the leftist political parties, most 27 trade unions, teacher's organizations, and some civil society organizations 28 remained as a minority and Turkish nationalism upheld its dominance in the 29 north until late 1990s. Nevertheless, the end of Cold War triggered the rise of 30 identity politics in the world and North Cyprus was also influenced by this 31 global trend. Turkish Cypriot leftist political parties abandoned their pro-Soviet 32 stance and adopted a Western European style social-democratic identity. 33 Indeed, they emerged as the strongest supporters of Cyprus' EU membership 34 and perceived it as the only possible framework within which a common 35 Cypriotness can be constructed (Ramm, 2006: 531) . 36 While the leftist parties quickly and eagerly welcomed the involvement of 37 the EU in the Cyprus problem, the parties on the right perceived it as a threat implemented an economic re-structuring based on neo-liberal privatization, 8 promotion of small business enterprises and the growth of tourism industry. 9 Consequently, the Turkish Cypriot economy grew during 1990s despite the 10 restrictions and the Turkish migrants were seen as the source of urgently 11 needed cheap labour. Nonetheless, the unintended consequence of these 12 developments was the polarization of the north's population into two main 13 groups namely Turkish Cypriots and Turkish migrants. Despite their lower 14 economic status, migrants especially those who are naturalized citizens of the 15 TRNC, were seen as a threat to Turkish Cypriot identity and political will by 16 Cypriotists. 17 Apart from a class-based distinction, cultural and ethnic differences 18 between the Turkish Cypriots and the new migrants also increased hostility 19 between the two groups. Many of the new-comers were of Kurdish or Arab 20 descent from the impoverished South-eastern Anatolia and settled in old 21 Nicosia, which increased their visibility. The socio-economic inequality also 22 dramatically increased crime rates in the north creating a perceived or actual negotiation process was a turning point for the Cypriotist camp in the north and 1 solution was portrayed as a way to defeat Turkish nationalism, secure the 2 Cypriot identity and extend its 'self' to the European identity. Accordingly, 3 Cypriotist leaders highlighted the unified fate of all Cypriots and emphasized 4 the commonalities between the two Cypriot communities. The term 'Turkish- 5 speaking Cypriot' was also presented as an alternative identification to the 6 more common term of 'Turkish Cypriot'. Some Cypriotists also promoted the 7 usage of Turkish Cypriot dialect rather than standard Turkish as a marker of a 8 separate identity and a symbol of resistance to Ankara's socio-political 9 influence in the north.
Construction of Turkish Cypriot Identity:
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During the negotiations, some leftist activists such as the authors of daily 11 Afrika newspaper criticized Turkey and its military forces on the island openly 12 to the extent of calling Ankara a colonial, occupying power. 13 Cypriotist 13 discourses demonized the status quo and particularly highlighted the Cypriotism in the Post-Annan Plan Period: 28 29 Although bitterly disappointed with the Greek Cypriot rejection, most Greek Cypriot presidential elections. Christofias' Presidency had finally 3 brought two Cypriotist leaders to power in both sides of the green line and was 4 regarded in the north as an attempt by Greek Cypriots to correct their 'mistake' 5 in 2004 (Loizides, 2015) . Soon, an indirect negotiation process was re- The economic crisis in the south also led to the defeat of Christofias in 13 Presidential elections by Nikos Anastasiadis who had supported the Annan 14 Plan back in 2004. 15 In his victory speech, Mr. Anastasiadis said 'I sincerely wish to find a 16 solution to the Cyprus Problem so that both sides can live together in 17 Europe'. 18 After the elections, the negotiations were expected to commence on 18 October 2013. Nonetheless, the Greek side insisted on a joint declaration 19 before the beginning of official negotiations. The declaration was achieved in 20 February 2014 and highlighted the unsustainability of the status quo, set the 21 framework for the new negotiation process and confirmed the main principles 22 for a settlement. The adoption of the Joint Declaration was followed by formal 23 negotiations with a new momentum for the settlement of the Cyprus Problem. 24 Nevertheless, the talks were suspended when Turkey sent a warship to the 
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The elections between two polarizing candidates, incumbent Eroğlu and 31 Akıncı, reflected a conflict of identities comprised by Turkish nationalism 32 versus Cypriotism. Akıncı refered to Turkey and the north as two 'sibling 33 countries', while rejecting the conventional 'motherland-babyland' rhetoric 34 and emphasized the importance of Turkish Cypriots' self-sufficiency, change 35 and solution in his campaign. 19 Whereas, Eroğlu's campaign emphasized 36 maintaining Turkey's guarantee in Cyprus and promised a solution within two 37 years. 20 Another candidate was Kudret Özersay, a former negotiator and 38 academic, who highlighted domestic issues and promised to combat corruption 39 and nepotism while following an active diplomacy in negotiations 21 visiting the north, while Anastasiades submitted the locations of minefields in 7 the region that had been planted by Greek Cypriots during the conflict. 8 Subsequently, the two sides achieved a certain level of convergence on 9 governance and citizenship yet disagreed on territory and security issues.
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During late 2016 and 2017, several rounds of talks were held in Switzerland, 11 first in Mont-Pelerin and then in Crans-Montana. Nonetheless, the leaders were 12 not able to achieve necessary further convergence on territorial adjustments, 13 security and guarantees, ending the process fruitless one more time. coalition government remains ambiguous considering its deep divergence with 20 the AKP and the delays in transfer of financial support from Ankara which is 21 viewed as an instrument of political pressure. Turkey's attempts to bypass 22 Akıncı and negotiate directly with Greek Cypriots over alternative models of 23 solution including a 'loose/decentralized federation' 24 also raises prospect of 24 tension with Ankara in the foreseeable future. 
